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I THINK WE SHOULD SEE OTHER PEOPLE: 
THE BENEFITS OF ELIMINATING HANDSET 
EXCLUSIVITY AND INSTITUTING TIERED 
PRICING IN THE MOBILE BROADBAND 
MARKET 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1973, the first portable handset cell phone was introduced at a press 
conference in New York City.1 Since that time, cell phones have evolved 
almost unimaginably. First, there was the flip phone, then slim phones, and 
then features such as email and mobile broadband access were introduced.2 
Between 2005 and 2008, the number of mobile wireless data plan 
subscribers exploded from zero to over 14.5 million.3 The continued 
evolution of cell phones has led to handset exclusivity.4 Handset exclusivity 
results when a contract between a handset manufacturer and a wireless 
carrier explicitly requires that a new handset is exclusively compatible with 
a specific carrier.5 This type of agreement is most famously illustrated by 
the iPhone, which, until February 2011,6 had been compatible only with 
AT&T’s wireless network.7 
The two main governing bodies overseeing the mobile broadband 
market are the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The FCC regulates mobile broadband 
relating to handset exclusivity and net neutrality through two key regulatory 
decisions made by the FCC. The first is the Cellular CPE Bundling Order, 
issued in 1992, in which the FCC repealed an earlier decision requiring 
wireless carriers, like traditional landline carriers, to sell their services 
unbundled from the hardware used to connect to the network.8 As a result, 
wireless carriers who were originally prevented from selling handsets 
                                                                                                                                
 1. Robert Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Why the iPhone Won’t Last Forever and What the 
Government Should Do to Promote its Successor, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 313, 317 
(2010). 
 2. Id. at 317–23.  
 3. Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated 
Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 748 (2010). 
 4. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 1, at 317.  
 5. Handset Exclusivity, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, http://www.publicknowledge.org/issues/handset 
-exclusivity (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
 6. Press Release, Apple Inc., Verizon Wireless & Apple Team Up to Deliver iPhone 4 on 
Verizon (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/01/11Verizon-Wireless-Apple 
-Team-Up-to-Deliver-iPhone-4-on-Verizon.html. 
 7. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 1, at 324.  
 8. See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C. 2d 420, 
423 (1968) [hereinafter Use of the Carterfone Device]; Bundling of Cellular Customer Premises 
Equip. & Cellular Serv., 7 FCC Rcd. 4028 (1992) (report & order) [hereinafter CPE Bundling 
Order]. 
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exclusively tied to their networks were given the freedom to do so.9 The 
second is the decision by the FCC to classify mobile broadband as an 
information service.10 This decision, in light of recent events, has limited 
the FCC’s ability to regulate mobile broadband.11 Yet, when one door 
closes, another opens. Due to the FCC’s decision to classify mobile 
broadband as an information service, the FTC, which does not have 
regulatory power over common carriers, but possesses the power to regulate 
information services, gained the ability to exert regulatory control over 
mobile broadband.12 
Agreements between wireless providers and handset manufacturers 
resulting in handset exclusivity have a significant impact on net neutrality. 
Simply defined, net neutrality is the concept that internet users should have 
unrestricted access to legal content, and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
should not be able to impede the dissemination of such information.13 The 
idea of maintaining an open and unrestricted internet is based on the 
philosophy that the information traveling through a network should remain 
completely independent from the provider of the network and not influence 
the flow of information on an ISP’s network.14 
Proponents of net neutrality fear that if left unrestricted, ISPs would be 
free to block or slow the delivery of content for reasons such as corporate 
partnerships or direct competition with the provider itself.15 This fear is not 
unfounded. In the past, the FCC has had to take action in cases where 
broadband providers were blocking content from passing through their 
networks.16 In 2005, Madison River Communications paid $15,000 and 
agreed to abstain from blocking subscribers’ use of the internet telephone 
service Vonage.17 Professor Edward Felton explains that the internet has 
been successful because of “its openness to new services. Google and 
                                                                                                                                
 9. See generally CPE Bundling Order, supra note 8 (“Despite our concerns about the status 
of competition in the cellular service market, the records supports [sic] the conclusion that 
clarifying the current bundling policy to allow facilities-based carriers to bundle cellular CPE and 
service would not have an adverse impact on the cellular CPE market.”). 
 10. See Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireless 
Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901 (2007) (declaratory ruling) [hereinafter Appropriate Regulatory 
Treatment]. 
 11. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 12. See FTC, STAFF REPORT, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY 38 (June 
2007) [hereinafter BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY]. 
 13. Claire Cain Miller & Brian Stelter, Web Plan is Dividing Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
12, 2010, at B.1. 
 14. Internet Freedom and Innovation at Risk: Why Congress Must Restore Strong Net 
Neutrality Protection, ACLU (Sept. 22, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/free-speech/internet-freedom 
-and-innovation-risk-why-congress-must-restore-strong-net-neutrality-pro [hereinafter Internet 
Freedom and Innovation at Risk]. 
 15. See id.  
 16. See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 644; Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295, 4297 
(2005) (consent decree). 
 17. Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. at 4297. 
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Facebook were started by students; eBay was started by a guy in his 
apartment. These innovators didn’t need to beg or buy permission from 
anyone. . . . [T]heir traffic got the same treatment as everyone else’s.”18 If 
the “open” internet was to be transformed into one governed, not by users, 
but by service providers, net neutrality proponents argue that the incentive 
to innovate that existed at the infancy of some of the most popular and 
influential websites today would be extinguished.19 Without the guarantee 
that their inventions would be compatible with all internet connections, the 
creators of Facebook, Google, and eBay may have seen the time 
commitment and financial risk involved in developing their new technology 
stacked too heavily against them.20 Albert Wenger, a partner at Union 
Square Ventures, points out that “it is easy to lose sight of the most basic 
principle that net neutrality is trying to achieve: the ability for innovative 
start-ups to deliver their content and services on a level playing field with 
incumbents.”21 In addition to concern about how content flows through 
broadband networks, net neutrality proponents are equally concerned with 
how a customer is able to access the content. The ability for a consumer to 
attach any device to any network is a basic tenet of net neutrality.22 
New policies, such as tiered pricing for wireless broadband access, 
although viewed negatively by some net neutrality proponents, provide 
incentives for wireless broadband providers to expand network 
capabilities.23 Additionally, these pricing schemes would alleviate over-
stressed networks24 and offer greater customer clarity regarding the services 
received, coupled with valuable pricing options. Handset exclusivity, 
however, greatly reduces customer freedom since customers are locked in 
to a specific provider. This lockup causes concern over content 
discrimination due to vertical and horizontal integration and the financial 
impracticability of switching carriers and purchasing a compatible handset. 
This note will discuss both handset exclusivity and tiered pricing as 
they apply to net neutrality. The elimination of handset exclusivity, coupled 
with the implementation of tiered pricing for mobile broadband data, strikes 
                                                                                                                                
 18. Edward W. Felton, ‘Neutrality’ Is Hard to Define, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/8/9/who-gets-priority-on-the-web/net-neutrality-is 
-hard-to-define. 
 19. Neutrality Encourages Innovation, OPPOSING VIEWS, http://www.opposingviews.com 
/arguments/neutrality-encourages-innovation (last visited Mar. 14, 2012). 
 20. Id.  
 21. Nick Bilton, More on the Net Neutrality Debate, BITS N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2010, 1:19 
PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/12/inside-the-net-neutrality-debate/ (quoting Albert 
Wegner) (omission in original). 
 22. Internet Freedom and Innovation at Risk, supra note 14.  
 23. Editorial, The Internet’s Future, WASH. POST, June 12, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/11/AR2006061100707.html. 
 24. Morgan Stanley, The Mobile Internet Report Key Themes 405 (Dec. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.morganstanley.com/institutional/techresearch/mobile_internet_report122009.html 
[hereinafter Key Themes]. 
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a fair balance between net neutrality concerns and the need for effective 
network management tools, leading to a realistic idea of net neutrality as the 
market stands today. Part I of this note will outline a definition of net 
neutrality and provide an introduction to the arguments both for and against 
net neutrality. Part II provides an in-depth look at both past and present 
federal regulation of broadband services. Part III discusses handset 
exclusivity and the effects of the FCC’s decision to allow carriers to bundle 
services with hardware, along with the effects that vertical and horizontal 
integration have on net neutrality. Part IV provides insight into tiered 
pricing, the FTC’s ability to regulate deceptive practices, and tiered 
pricing’s ability to properly manage stressed mobile broadband networks. 
Finally, Part V examines why the elimination of handset exclusivity and the 
implementation of tiered pricing strikes the best balance between net 
neutrality and carriers’ needs for the customer.  
I. NET NEUTRALITY 
In 2005, the FCC released a statement on net neutrality, which set forth 
four principles to maintain an open internet.25 In its report, the FCC stated: 
[T]o ensure that broadband networks are widely deployed, open, 
affordable, and accessible to all consumers, the Commission adopts the 
following principles:  
 . . . consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of 
their choice.  
 . . . consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of 
their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement. 
 . . . consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices 
that do not harm the network.  
 . . . consumers are entitled to competition among network 
providers, application and service providers, and content 
providers.26 
Consequently, this line of thinking is in direct opposition with that of 
handset exclusivity. 
Opponents of net neutrality argue that tiered pricing would increase 
broadband infrastructure.27 An experiment conducted in England 
                                                                                                                                
 25. See FCC, 05-151 POLICY STATEMENT ON NET NEUTRALITY 3 (2005), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-05-151A1.pdf [hereinafter POLICY 
STATEMENT ON NET NEUTRALITY]. 
 26. Id. at 3 (footnotes omitted).  
 27. SARA PHILPOTT, IBM, EVOLVING MOBILE BROADBAND BUSINESS MODELS 7 (Mar. 
2011), available at http://ibmtelconewsletter.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/broadband-paper 
-march-2011.pdf. 
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highlighted the need for more robust broadband networks.28 Three hundred 
gigabytes of data were divided and loaded onto USB drives that were then 
attached to a group of carrier pigeons.29 The pigeons were then directed to a 
site 120 miles away.30 At the same time, the 300-gigabyte video file carried 
by the birds was sent to the same location via the internet.31 The results 
were noteworthy. “One hour and fifteen minutes later, all ten carrier 
pigeons had successfully delivered their USB drives. Only 25% of the video 
had . . . been successfully downloaded.”32 This experiment illustrates the 
need for the expansion of broadband network infrastructure. Consequently, 
net neutrality opponents contend that allowing service providers to alter 
their pricing structures would incentivize the construction of more robust 
networks.33 Additionally, opponents of net neutrality argue that the 
broadband market is competitive enough, making governmental regulation 
unnecessary.34 As Professor David Gelernter explains, “Maybe a company 
should be allowed to do what it likes on its own . . . . If Verizon users don’t 
like Verizon’s service, they’ll switch to a different I.S.P. [That] is called 
‘competition.’”35 Although both proponents and opponents of net neutrality 
have drawn clear battle lines, both sides can agree that the issue 
surrounding mobile broadband will ultimately be decided by the federal 
government, either through administrative or congressional action. 
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF BROADBAND SERVICE 
Under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, common carriers 
are subject to strict regulations by the FCC.36 In 2002, however, the FCC 
issued a declaratory ruling finding that “cable modem service is a single, 
integrated service that enables the subscriber to utilize Internet access 
service through a cable provider’s facilities.”37 Therefore, “[c]able modem 
service is not itself and does not include an offering of telecommunications 
                                                                                                                                
 28. Renee Oricchio, Where Carrier Pigeons Are Faster Than the Internet, INC. (Sept. 23, 
2010), available at http://www.inc.com/tech-blog/where-carrier-pigeons-are-faster-than-the-
internet.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+inc%2Fhe
adlines+%28Inc.com+Headlines%29. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Id.  
 33. See The Internet’s Future, supra note 23.  
 34. Robert A. Penchuk, Unleashing the Open Mobile Internet, 10 J. HIGH TECH L. 74, 83 
(2009). 
 35. David Gelernter, Call It ‘Net Irrationality’, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010, http://www 
.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/08/09/who-gets-priority-on-the-web/call-it-net-irrationality-2. 
 36. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–212 (2006) (affording the FCC power 
to regulate a common carrier’s service, charges, pricing policies, and corresponding violation 
penalties).  
 37. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 
FCC Rcd. 4798, 4823 (Mar. 14, 2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed rulemaking).  
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service to subscribers.”38 Consequently, broadband cable modem service is 
“properly classified as an interstate information service” and not as a 
common carrier.39 The Supreme Court upheld this decision.40 As a result, 
broadband cable modem service was no longer governed by Title II and, 
consequently, was no longer subject to the same restrictions as common 
carriers.41 Subsequently, in 2007, the FCC extended the moniker of 
“information service” to cover mobile broadband service.42 
Removal of Title II restrictions leaves broadband providers subject only 
to the FCC’s Title I ancillary jurisdiction.43 The FCC has the power to 
regulate ancillary jurisdiction under Title I under the following conditions: 
“(1) the Commission’s general jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the 
Communications Act] covers the regulated subject and (2) the regulations 
are reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance of its 
statutorily mandated responsibilities.”44 Ancillary regulatory power under 
Title I is significantly weaker than the FCC’s direct regulatory power under 
Title II because no precise definition of “reasonably ancillary” is provided. 
A pro-net neutrality organization, Public Knowledge, explains, “The 
problem is that every time the FCC trie[s] to act in the broadband space, it 
would essentially be rolling the dice. Whenever the FCC trie[s] to protect 
consumers it would have to wait to see if a court agreed with its claim of 
authority before taking meaningful action.”45 This concern was illustrated in 
Comcast Corp. v. FCC. In Comcast, subscribers of Comcast’s broadband 
service discovered that Comcast had been blocking some file-sharing 
websites.46 Comcast argued that the interference of service was simply 
network management due to a limited amount of broadband capacity. The 
FCC, acting pursuant to what it believed was its Title I ancillary 
jurisdiction, ordered Comcast to disclose the details of its network 
management policy and stated that it would issue an injunction against 
Comcast should it not disclose its policy or continue to discriminate against 
the file-sharing sites.47 Comcast appealed the order, and the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the FCC’s Title I ancillary 
jurisdiction did not apply to a broadband service provider’s network 
management because “the Commission . . . failed to tie its assertion of 
                                                                                                                                
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 4802.  
 40. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 974 (2005) 
(holding that cable broadband providers are exempt from mandatory common carrier regulation). 
 41. Id. at 1000.  
 42. Appropriate Regulatory Treatment, supra note 10, at 5901.  
 43. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976. 
 44. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 
 45. Public Knowledge Explains: The Comcast-Bittorrent Decision, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Apr. 
6, 2010, 3:48 PM) (on file with author). 
 46. Comcast, 600 F.3d at 644.  
 47. Id.  
2012] Handset Exclusivity & Instituting Tiered Pricing 655 
ancillary authority over Comcast’s Internet service to any ‘statutorily 
mandated responsibility.’”48 Because the FCC classified wireless broadband 
as an information service, this decision severely inhibited the FCC’s ability 
to regulate wireless broadband and opened the door to allow wireless 
broadband providers to regulate their networks as they see fit, without 
regulatory oversight. Thus, in response to the Comcast decision, the FCC 
has hinted that it may seek to reclassify broadband service as a 
telecommunication service. Doing so would bring broadband service back 
within the fold of Title II regulation.49 
In the meantime, however, the FTC has shown renewed interest in net 
neutrality.50 Pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act (the FTC Act), 
the FTC has the authority “to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations 
. . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”51 Under the 
FTC Act, the FTC does not have the power to regulate common carriers; 
however, since broadband services are not classified as common carriers, 
they are subject to FTC regulation.52 Consequently, the FTC has 
investigated broadband providers regarding internet access,53 access to and 
pricing of content, and deceptive marketing and billing practices.54 The 
FTC describes its jurisdiction over broadband as follows: 
[First,] the FTC has both authority and experience in the enforcement of 
competition and consumer protection law provisions pertinent to 
broadband Internet access. Second, the FTC Act provisions regarding 
“[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,” are general and 
flexible in nature, as demonstrated by judicial and administrative decisions 
across diverse markets. Third, the FTC’s investigative and enforcement 
actions have been party- and market-specific; that is, neither the general 
body of antitrust and consumer protection law nor the FTC’s enforcement 
and policy record determines any particular broadband connectivity policy 
or commits the Commission to favoring any particular model of 
broadband deployment.55 
                                                                                                                                
 48. Id. at 661 (citation omitted).  
 49. Austin Schlick, General Counsel, FCC, Statement Outlining the FCC’s New Approach to 
Internet Oversight (May 6, 2010), available at http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-20004324 
-93.html?tag=mncol;txt. 
 50. Aruna Viswanatha, Could the FTC Regulate Net Neutrality?, MAIN JUSTICE (Apr. 12, 
2010, 5:45 PM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/04/12/could-the-ftc-regulate-net-neutrality/. 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006). 
 52. BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 12, at 38. 
 53. See Complaint, In re Am. Online, Inc. & Time Warner Inc., No. C-3989 (FTC. Dec. 14, 
2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aolcomplaint.pdf. 
 54.  BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 12, at 39.  
 55.  Id. at 41 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).  
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As a result, “the FTC could require a broadband provider to disclose 
how it manages its network and what speeds it offers.”56 Nonetheless, some 
are skeptical of the FTC’s ability to actually prosecute such a case. “[T]he 
kinds of practices that often come up under the guise of net neutrality would 
rarely be a violation of the antitrust laws. . . . [I]n order to achieve the broad 
objectives of people advocating net neutrality, you have to have 
congressional action or reclassification.”57 
On December 21, 2010, the FCC passed new net neutrality 
regulations.58 The new rules “create two classes of Internet access, one for 
fixed-line providers and the other for the wireless Net.”59 As a result, 
landline providers are prevented from blocking or unreasonably 
discriminating against content; however, due to heavy lobbying by Google 
and Verizon, wireless internet providers are not completely restricted from 
doing so.60 Therefore, in light of the Comcast decision and the questions 
surrounding the FTC’s ability to effectively regulate broadband, absent 
congressional intervention, it is unclear how the federal government could 
properly address wireless net neutrality concerns. Therefore, the issues of 
handset exclusivity and tiered pricing remain a significant concern in the 
discussion of mobile broadband neutrality. 
III. HANDSET EXCLUSIVITY 
The FCC has stated that “consumers are entitled to connect their choice 
of legal devices that do not harm the network.”61 When cell phones first 
entered the market, exclusivity deals between handset manufactures and 
wireless carriers were unheard of. Since 2004, however, almost every 
popular phone to enter the market has been subject to exclusivity.62 Initially, 
the Razr V3, Sidekick, iPhone, Blackberry Pearl, and Blackberry Curve 
were only compatible with a single wireless carrier.63  
There are essentially two ways in which carriers in the United States 
achieve handset exclusivity.64 First, Code Division Multiple Access 
                                                                                                                                
 56. Viswanatha, supra note 50.  
 57. Id. (quoting Donald Russell).  
 58. Net Neutrality, NYTIMES.COM (Dec. 22, 2010), http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference 
/timestopics/subjects/n/net_neutrality/index.html. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. POLICY STATEMENT ON NET NEUTRALITY, supra note 25, at 3 (footnote omitted).  
 62. Hahn & Singer, supra note 1, at 318.  
 63. Id. at 319; Parul Sharma, Motorola DRIOD X in July and Motorola DROID 2 in 
August…Get Ready to Grab, ABH NEWS (June 13, 2010), http://abh-news.com/motorola-driod-x 
-in-july-and-motorola-droid-2-in-august-get-ready-to-grab-3245.html.  
 64. Tim Wu, Wireless Net Neutrality: Cellular Carterfone and Consumer Choice in Mobile 
Broadband 8 (New Am. Found., Working Paper No. 17, 2007), available at http://www 
.newamerica.net/publications/policy/wireless_net_neutrality. 
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(CDMA) carriers,65 like Verizon,66 designate phones with an ID number, 
which allows the phone to access the network.67 “Without an approved ID 
number, telephones not sold by Verizon will not be recognized and cannot 
be used on the network. This effectively makes Verizon Wireless the 
gatekeeper of market entry for telephones on their network . . . .”68 Second, 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) carriers,69 like AT&T,70 
make use of phones with SIM cards.71 The SIM card was designed to make 
switching from one network to another as simple as removing the phone’s 
original SIM card and replacing it with a new one.72 Yet, “[t]he mobile 
device itself . . . can be designed to recognize and reject certain types of 
SIM cards based on information carried on the SIM, creating a ‘lock.’”73 
Thus, a customer who purchases a handset subject to exclusivity cannot 
access any other network aside from his or her carrier’s network. 
Accordingly, if an AT&T customer—who owns a phone subject to 
exclusivity with AT&T—wants to switch to Verizon, that customer is 
forced to purchase a new handset compatible with the Verizon network.74 
                                                                                                                                
 65. “CDMA stands for Code Division Multiple Access. It is a technique used for digital 
communication, and wireless technology in particular, that involves multiplexing. Whereas 
conventional communication systems use constant frequencies, CDMA uses multiple access, or 
multiplexing.” S. Roberts, What is CDMA?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is 
-cdma.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
 66. R. Kayne, What is the Difference Between GSM and CDMA?, WISEGEEK, http://www 
.wisegeek.com/what-is-the-difference-between-gsm-and-cdma.htm (last modified Feb. 23, 2012). 
 67. Wu, supra note 64, at 8.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Ken Black, What is GSM?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-gsm.htm (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2012).  
GSM, or Global System for Mobile Communications, is a cellular phone protocol that 
is popular in many parts of the world . . . .  
. . . . 
One of the distinctive features of the GSM system is the use of SIM cards. This card 
will store all personal data and contacts on it. Once a phone is traded for a new one, 
transferring the data and activating the phone becomes simply a matter of changing the 
card.  
Id.  
 70. Our Mobile Broadband and GSM Technology, AT&T, http://www.wireless.att.com 
/learn/why/technology/mobile-broadband-and-GSM.jsp (last visited Dec. 22, 2010). 
 71. Black, supra note 69.  
 72. Wu, supra note 64, at 9.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Interestingly, beginning April 8, 2012, AT&T  
will offer qualifying customers the ability to unlock their AT&T iPhones. The only 
requirements are that a customer’s account must be in good standing, their device 
cannot be associated with a current and active term commitment on an AT&T customer 
account, and they need to have fulfilled their contract term, upgraded under one of our 
upgrade policies or paid an early termination fee.  
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This concept is directly at odds with the idea that consumers should be free 
to access content using equipment of their choosing.75 
In response to handset exclusivity and concerns about the relationship 
between handset manufacturers and carriers, Skype, an internet company, 
formally requested that the FCC apply the principles set forth in the 
Commission’s Carterfone decision to the wireless industry.76 Skype’s 
concern was that “[i]n an effort to prefer their own affiliated services and 
exclude rivals, carriers have disabled or crippled consumer-friendly features 
of mobile devices.”77 Skype argued that applying Carterfone “[would] 
ensure both that consumers retain a right to run the applications of their 
choosing and [the] right to attach all non-harmful devices to the wireless 
network.”78  
In Carterfone, AT&T penalized customers for attaching a device, 
known as the Carterfone, to their network.79 The penalty was based on an 
FCC rule which stated that “no equipment, apparatus, circuit or device not 
furnished by the telephone company shall be attached to or connected with 
the facilities furnished by the telephone company, whether physically, by 
induction or otherwise.”80 The FCC found that the Carterfone had no 
adverse effect on the network and that AT&T’s continued prohibition on 
third-party equipment “would be unreasonable and unduly 
discriminatory.”81 As a result, “the provisions prohibiting the use of 
customer-provided interconnecting devices should accordingly be 
stricken.”82 Initially, like wireline telecommunication services, the FCC 
required mobile equipment to be available for purchase unbundled from 
wireless service.83 In 1992, the FCC repealed that decision in the Cellular 
CPE Bundling Order.84 As a result, Skype requested that the FCC apply the 
standard in Carterfone to wireless carriers. Central to its decision to allow 
                                                                                                                                
Andrew Munchbach, AT&T to Begin Unlocking Off-Contract iPhones This Sunday, April 8th, 
ENDGAGET (Apr. 6, 2012, 1:23 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2012/04/06/atandt-to-begin 
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handset and service bundling was the existence of sufficient competition 
within the wireless service market and the finding that “carriers did not 
possess market power in the upstream market for handsets.”85 The FCC 
stated that “modifying the bundling policy is in the public interest because 
the public interest benefits of bundling in the cellular market outweigh the 
potential for competitive harm.”86 In coming to this decision, the FCC 
highlighted that “the records supports [sic] the conclusion that clarifying the 
current bundling policy to allow facilities-based carriers to bundle cellular 
CPE and service would not have an adverse impact on the cellular CPE 
market.”87 Proponents of applying the Carterfone standard to wireless 
carriers argue that “[y]ou just can’t sell in [the wireless] market like you do 
in others. The carriers have ultimate control over what products reach the 
market. If they don’t like what you’re doing, that’s too bad.”88 
Since the FCC’s decision to allow bundling was so closely tied to 
competition within the market, some believe that in order for the FCC’s 
position to change regarding handset exclusivity, the FCC would need to be 
presented with evidence of consumer harm due to a lack of competition.89 
This theory is evidenced by an FCC decision involving the Public Utilities 
Commission of Hawaii.90 In the petition, Hawaii asked the FCC for 
permission “to retain state regulatory authority over the rates for intrastate 
commercial mobile radio services.”91 In response, the FCC stated “that a 
petition must be based on demonstrable evidence of anticompetitive 
activity, or unjust and unreasonable, or unreasonably discriminatory, 
rates.”92 According to the FCC, “specific allegations of fact” are required to 
establish “anticompetitive or discriminatory practices or behavior by 
commercial mobile radio service providers.”93 Implementation of the 
Carterfone principles on the wireless broadband market would clearly be a 
decision made by the FCC and not by an individual state, but the FCC’s 
position in Petition on Behalf of the State of Hawaii shows a strong 
aversion to creating new regulation in the mobile communications market 
without clear evidence of anticompetitive behavior. 
In terms of handset exclusivity, the anticompetitive behavior the FCC 
covets in order to impose regulation may be found in two places. The first is 
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in the context of rural wireless carriers,94 and the second is in relation to 
vertical and horizontal integration. Phones subject to exclusivity cannot 
access networks other than the network their contract provides. As a result, 
rural, small, and even midsize carriers are unable to provide the same 
phones to their customers as those provided by major carriers. As the Rural 
Cellular Association points out, “If the nation’s small and mid-size wireless 
carriers are unable to get access to handsets that consumers have an interest 
in purchasing, the ability of these carriers to effectively compete with the 
nation’s largest carriers is significantly harmed.”95 Additionally, “customers 
served by smaller carriers and new entrants are prevented from accessing 
the most popular handsets and benefiting from the advances in wireless 
handset technology until years after their urban counterparts.”96 In 
conjunction with the Rural Cellular Association, the Public Interest 
Spectrum Coalition states, “Without handset exclusivity arrangements, the 
consumer could choose service provider and device independently. Instead, 
rural and small wireless carriers face substantial obstacles to gaining new 
customers by being unable to offer their customers desirable smartphones . . 
. .”97 
Although the FCC did not see any harm to consumers by allowing 
bundling, it is hard to imagine that the FCC could have envisioned harm to 
consumers, in the form of net neutrality concerns in regards to mobile 
communication, when the CPE decision was made in 1992. Professor 
Robert Frieden, an opponent of handset exclusivity, explains that “[w]e take 
for granted the right to own and attach telephones to the wired network. 
That freedom should extend to wireless networks . . . .”98 Proponents, 
however, contend that exclusivity fosters innovation in part because both 
the handset provider and carrier shoulder the risk of launching the new 
product.99 This is done partly by the wireless carrier subsidizing the cost of 
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the new phone, thereby making the retail price accessible to customers.100 
Although handset exclusivity may promote innovation, this overlooks the 
net neutrality concerns of content discrimination and the financial 
impracticability of switching from one carrier to another created by these 
exclusive deals. This, in turn, harms the consumer. 
In the context of the net neutrality debate, handset exclusivity, as it 
relates to vertical and horizontal integration, is of great concern. Vertical 
integration is defined as “the merging together of two businesses that are at 
different stages of production.”101 A clear example of vertical integration 
can be seen in the merger between NBC Universal and Comcast.102 
Comcast is a distributor of content through its cable and internet services.103 
Through the merger, Comcast gained control of NBC Universal, a producer 
of content through its ownership of local NBC stations, MSNBC, and 
Bravo.104 Therefore, Comcast is now not only a distributor of content, but 
also a major producer of content. As a result, the concern is that Comcast 
will discriminate against other content producers, limiting what is available 
to the consumer.105 In a 2007 staff report on broadband competition, the 
FTC found that “[i]n particular, proponents [of net neutrality] are concerned 
that providers may block or discriminate against unaffiliated content and 
applications, to the benefit of affiliated offerings.”106 This scenario could 
manifest itself when a broadband provider with significant market power in 
a given market has an interest in content or applications, creating an 
incentive to block or degrade competing content or applications.107 In 2005, 
the internet phone company Vonage filed a complaint with the FCC, stating 
that Madison River Communications, a phone and internet provider, was 
intentionally blocking internet users from accessing Vonage over the 
Madison River network.108 “For Madison River Communications, the 
interest in protecting current voice-based revenues made the case for 
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blocking [voice-over-internet protocol] services quite compelling.”109 
Ultimately, Madison River settled the matter by agreeing to remove the 
blockade and pay $15,000 pursuant to a consent decree.110 
The Madison River scenario is a significant concern in the wireless 
market. As of March 23, 2011, four wireless carriers showed a commanding 
grip on the wireless market in the United States.111 Verizon possessed a 
31.3 percent market share, AT&T a 26.6 percent share, Sprint a 16.1 
percent share, and T-Mobile rounded out the big four with a 12.2 percent 
share.112 With such a high level of market penetration, there is a significant 
incentive for any one of these carriers to show preferential treatment to 
affiliated content and discriminate against nonaffiliated or competitive 
content and services. This point was illustrated when it was reported that 
“Apple has declined to approve the Google Voice application for the iPhone 
and has removed related (and previously approved) third-party applications 
from the Apple App Store.”113 AT&T implied it was not involved, and 
Apple declined to comment.114 It is easy, however, to see the correlation 
between the Madison River case and the Google Voice matter. Like 
Vonage, Google Voice offers services via the internet that AT&T offers via 
its wireless network, including text messaging and voice services.115 In a 
similar case, Skype, another application that allows users to make phone 
calls via the internet, was initially approved only for use on the iPhone 
while the phone was connected to the internet through a Wi-Fi 
connection.116 This restriction prevented Skype users from using their 
phone as a substitute for AT&T’s wireless phone service. There is no 
question that restrictions like these in the mobile broadband market reduce 
the open internet and are contrary to the principle that “consumers are 
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entitled to run applications and use services of their choice, subject to the 
needs of law enforcement.”117  
In contrast to vertical integration, horizontal integration is defined as 
the “acquisition of additional business activities that are at the same level of 
the value chain in similar . . . industries.”118 Once again, the Comcast/NBC 
Universal merger provides a clear example. As Dr. Mark Cooper explained 
in testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee, 
NBC content is available online in a variety of forms and on different 
websites and services. Most prominently, of course, NBC is a stakeholder 
in Hulu – an online video distribution portal that draws millions of 
viewers. Comcast has put resources into developing its own online video 
site – “Fancast”– where consumers can find content owned by the cable 
operator. The merger eliminates this nascent, head-to-head competition.119 
The fear is that horizontal integration destroys competitive practices.120 
Professor John Blevins points out that “[s]ince 2000, the [wireless] industry 
has rapidly consolidated in a wave of mergers of all sizes.”121 He goes on to 
highlight the fact that “[t]hese mergers have created a much different world 
than existed at the beginning of the decade . . . . [T]he top four carriers now 
command roughly 87% of subscribers (compared to less than half a decade 
earlier).”122 The fear expressed concerning the destruction of competitive 
practices regarding the Comcast/NBC Universal merger is the same 
regarding the rapid consolidation of the wireless industry.123 In letters to the 
FCC and the Department of Justice in 2009, Senator Herb Kohl stated, “I 
am concerned that the concentrated nature of the cell phone marketplace 
could lead to future price increases for this and other cell phone services 
relied upon by millions of Americans.”124 This fear became even more 
prevalent when the now defunct AT&T/T-Mobile merger was proposed last 
                                                                                                                                
 117. POLICY STATEMENT ON NET NEUTRALITY, supra note 25, at 3.  
 118. Horizontal Integration, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h 
/horizontalintegration.asp#axzz1rNg9Ri4L (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
 119. Mark Cooper, Dir. of Research, Consumer Fed’n of Am., Testimony before the Commerce 
Comm., U.S. Senate: Consumers, Competition and Consolidation in the Video Broadband Market 
5 (Mar. 11, 2010), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id 
=e6645c9b-71a8-4b9a-9552-dd0dafd0ba46.  
 120. See id.  
 121. John Blevins, Death of the Revolution: The Legal War on Competitive Broadband 
Technologies, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 85, 92 (2009). “These mergers include: NextWave/Cingular 
(2004); Cingular/AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (AT&T) (2004); Alltel/Western Wireless Corp. 
(2005); Nextel/Sprint (2005); AT&T/BellSouth Corp. (2007); AT&T/Dobson (2007); T-
Mobile/SunCom Wireless (2008); AT&T/Aloha Partners (2008); Verizon Wireless/Rural Cellular 
(2008); Verizon/Alltel (2008); AT&T/Centennial (2009) (announced).” Id.  
 122. Id. (footnote omitted).  
 123. See Cecilia Kang, Key Senator Backs Telecom Probe, WASH. POST, July 7, 2009, at A.12, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/06/AR2009070603 
526.html. 
 124. Id. (quoting Senator Herb Kohl).  
664 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 6 
year.125 Horizontal integration has a direct effect on wireless broadband 
neutrality because as the wireless market becomes more consolidated, there 
is less consumer choice regarding service and a reduced incentive on the 
part of the carriers to offer data plans at competitive prices. If competition is 
eliminated, prices can be set at whatever level the carrier chooses. This 
issue is further compounded by handset exclusivity because fewer choices 
within the wireless market are available due to a customer’s inability to 
connect their device to any of the other remaining networks. Therefore, if 
competition is reduced due to horizontal integration within the wireless 
market and a carrier decides to set data plans at monopoly prices, a 
customer subject to handset exclusivity would be trapped into either paying 
the higher price for a data plan or spending additional money to purchase a 
new handset with a different carrier. 
During the AOL/Time Warner merger, the FTC acted on this concern 
of anticompetitive pricing in the wireline broadband market.126 Fearing that 
the merger would reduce AOL’s incentive to offer broadband internet at a 
competitive price to cable, the FTC issued an order requiring “the company, 
in areas where it provided cable broadband service, to offer AOL’s DSL 
service in the same manner and at the same retail pricing as in areas where 
it did not provide cable broadband service.”127 Clearly, there is regulatory 
concern over horizontal mergers similar to those seen in the wireless 
industry in the past decade and “[t]he FTC maintains any term that is ‘likely 
to affect [consumers’] choice of, or conduct regarding a product’ is material 
and enforceable.”128 As we have seen, there is at least some evidence that 
horizontal integration, coupled with handset exclusivity, significantly 
affects a consumer’s choice of product—an affect which is at odds with the 
FCC’s statement that “consumers are entitled to competition among 
network providers . . . .”129 
For critics of net neutrality, it is easy to argue that if wireless customers 
do not approve of the actions of their current carrier, they can simply switch 
to a different one. Yet, for a customer who has purchased an internet-
capable smartphone subject to a contract of exclusivity (making his or her 
phone inoperable on a different wireless network), simply switching to a 
different carrier is financially impracticable since it would require 
purchasing a new smartphone that is compatible with the new network. This 
                                                                                                                                
 125. Michael J. De La Merced, AT&T Ends $39 Billion Bid for T-Mobile, DEALB%K N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2011, 4:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/att-withdraws-39-bid 
-for-t-mobile/. 
 126. Cody Vitello, Network Neutrality Generates a Contentious Debate Among Experts: Should 
Consumers Be Worried?, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 513, 535 (2010). 
 127. BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 12, at 39 (footnote 
omitted). 
 128. Vitello, supra note 126, at 536 (quoting Federal Trade Comm’n, Staff Report, Broadband 
Connectivity Competition Policy, 135 (2007)) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). 
 129. POLICY STATEMENT ON NET NEUTRALITY, supra note 25, at 3.  
2012] Handset Exclusivity & Instituting Tiered Pricing 665 
sentiment was echoed in a report issued by the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), which stated that “consumer groups . . . perceive . . . 
exclusive handset arrangements as creating . . . anticompetitive switching 
costs.”130 Because of this, if a wireless carrier decides to exhibit preferential 
treatment to certain content carried via its data network, the customers 
could feel as though their only choices are to either remain with their 
current carrier, subject to the content discrimination, or be forced to 
purchase a new handset with a different carrier. Similarly, with regards to 
switching to AT&T for the iPhone, one commentator stated that with the 
extra cost of buying the iPhone itself, “it may make more financial sense to 
stay put with your existing carrier and buy a comparable device instead.”131 
This scenario is at odds with the notion of maintaining an open internet. 
Wireline broadband providers argue that prioritizing content is essential 
to network management due to the high demand for limited bandwidth.132 
The issue of network congestion, however, is not limited to standard 
wireline broadband. Network congestion exists in the wireless world as 
well.133 According to a 2009 study, when wireless networks reach 75 
percent utilization, the networks encounter problems with just a slight 
increase in data traffic during high-usage periods.134 The study goes on to 
point out that, at the time the data was collected, network utilization in 
major markets was between 80–90 percent, well over the 75 percent 
warning level.135 Additionally, it has been estimated that “[g]lobal mobile 
IP traffic [is] likely to grow [sixty-six times] by 2013,”136 and rising 
“smartphone penetration [and] emerging usage models (such as video/audio 
streaming) will stress carrier wireless networks.”137 In line with these 
predictions, Verizon has stated that it predicts 70–80 percent of its 
customers will eventually utilize smartphones for their wireless needs.138 
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This congestion has led wireless providers to begin implementing tiered-
pricing models for data plans.139 Although consumers fear the change to 
tiered-pricing plans,140 this structure is in the best interest of both mobile 
broadband neutrality and the consumer. 
IV. TIERED PRICING 
Due to considerable network congestion throughout wireless networks, 
a transition from the standard “unlimited” data plans to a tiered-pricing 
structure will help manage already stressed networks141 and provide 
financial incentives for carriers to make networks more robust.142 
During the infancy of the mobile communications market, individual 
states had the power to regulate mobile pricing.143 The federal government, 
however, wrestled away police power over mobile communications pricing 
in 1993 by amending the Communications Act of 1934 to read, “[N]o State 
or local government shall have any authority to regulate the entry of or the 
rates charged by any commercial mobile service or any private mobile 
service . . . .”144 As a result, the power to regulate any new pricing plans lies 
within the federal government’s purview. 
The FCC has acknowledged that tiered pricing is a “permissible 
network management technique.”145 Professor Babette Boliek points out, 
“[T]he move to two-tiered pricing for broadband consumption by the 
mobile industry would appear a natural development. The industry, by 
extensive trial and evolution, established a multi-tiered pricing structure, 
based primarily on usage for its core voice transmission business.”146 This 
change may not only be a natural transition, it might be a necessary one. 
The chairman of the FCC has predicted an ominous future, indicating “a 
looming spectrum crisis” if more broadband space cannot be allocated for 
mobile internet use.147 
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AT&T and Verizon have already implemented a consumption-based 
tiered-pricing scheme for its data plans.148 Sprint is currently the only major 
carrier still offering an unlimited data plan.149 A shift in pricing structure is 
beneficial for three reasons: First, a tiered-pricing structure allows 
customers to choose a tier based on their actual usage without subsidizing 
high volume users.150 Professor Boliek explains, “Under differential pricing, 
the grandmother who sends occasional e-mails will pay less for Internet 
access than the individual who downloads 1,500 HD movies in one month. 
Price is the most common means by which scarce resources may be most 
efficiently allocated.”151 Second, allowing providers to offer a consumer-
based tiered-pricing system is content neutral.152 Unlike tiered-pricing 
structures in which content producers pay broadband providers for 
prioritized delivery of their content, consumer-based tiered pricing does not 
favor any type of content over another.153 Third, tiered pricing creates 
greater transparency between the provider and consumer. Under the 
common “unlimited” data plans, the term “unlimited” never really held true 
to the definition of the word.154 
Professor Catherine Sandoval writes that in light of the FTC’s standard 
for deceptive practices, advertisements for “unlimited” data plans with 
restrictions buried in the seemingly never-ending fine print “would not meet 
the FTC Act’s standard.”155 The FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in or affecting commerce.”156 “To prove a deceptive act or 
practice under § 5(a)(1), the FTC must show three elements: (1) a 
representation, omission, or practice, that (2) is likely to mislead consumers 
acting reasonably under the circumstances, and (3) [that] the representation, 
omission, or practice is material.”157 “The law is violated if the first contact 
. . . is secured by deception . . . even though the true facts are made known 
to the buyer before he enters into the contract of purchase.”158 Tiered 
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pricing would not eliminate all claims of this nature; however, the proposed 
Broadband Internet Fairness Act sets forth viable safeguards against unfair 
tiered-pricing plans.159 Professor Boliek points out, “[T]here is no carve out 
for mobile operators and . . . this would likely cover a great many 
participants in the mobile industry who offer even limited Internet 
access.”160 The Broadband Internet Fairness Act states, “It shall be unlawful 
for major broadband Internet service providers to offer volume usage 
service plans imposing rates, terms, and conditions that are unjust, 
unreasonable, or unreasonably discriminatory.”161 Under the Act, if a 
broadband provider intends to implement tiered pricing, the provider is 
required to file a plan analysis with the FTC that does the following: 
(1) identifies the different service tiers of broadband Internet service to be 
offered on the basis of different data transmission volumes;  
(2) specifies the different rates, terms, and conditions to be imposed for 
such tiers;  
(3) provides an analysis of the economic reasonableness and necessity for 
imposing such tiers.162  
Under the Act, enforcement of tiered-pricing plans would be under the 
FTC’s jurisdiction,163 and any violation would “be treated as a violation of a 
rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or practice prescribed under section 
18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.”164 Safeguards such as 
those proposed by the Broadband Internet Fairness Act would ensure that, 
unlike the vague “unlimited” data plans, consumers would know, pursuant 
to the act, exactly what the individual tiers offer and that they have been 
deemed fair and reasonable. This would allow for a more informed and 
transparent decision when choosing a data plan. 
Unfortunately, tiered pricing coupled with handset exclusivity limits the 
consumer’s options in the same way that handset exclusivity limits the 
consumer’s options in the context of content discrimination and vertical and 
horizontal integration discussed above. Because the customer is tied to the 
carrier through handset exclusivity, the customer would be unable to shop 
for the tiered-pricing plan for their specific needs without incurring the 
additional cost of purchasing a compatible handset, assuming the consumer 
chose to change carriers. One of the criticisms of tiered pricing is that the 
possible overage charges associated with exceeding the allocated bandwidth 
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per month may discourage some users from accessing the internet, reducing 
the overall “openness” of the internet that net advocates of neutrality are 
fighting to maintain.165 Handset exclusivity exacerbates these concerns. 
Typically coupled with a handset, subject to exclusivity, is a contract with 
the carrier that binds the consumer to a sizeable early termination fee.166 
Verizon charges an early termination fee of up to $350,167 AT&T $325,168 
and T-Mobile up to $200.169 In January 2010, AT&T settled a class action 
lawsuit claiming that the early termination fees included in customer 
contracts were unfairly high.170 Customers filed the suit claiming “the fees 
were illegal because they bore no relation to the carrier’s actual costs, and 
discouraged customers from switching carriers.”171 AT&T did not 
acknowledge any wrongdoing, but agreed to pay $18 million to customers 
to avoid litigation.172 Previously, Sprint settled similar claims to the tune of 
$17.5 million.173 Due to the settlement, the court did not rule on the legality 
of these early terminations.174 Still, customers acknowledged that the fees 
discourage switching carriers, contributing to the problems associated with 
handset exclusivity. Proponents fear that tiered pricing could restrict use of 
the mobile internet. The cost of many new model smartphones, provided 
that the consumer signs another contract subject to a similar termination 
fee, can be as much as $399.175 As a result, a consumer who is locked into a 
carrier through handset exclusivity, who does not find a pricing level that is 
suitable to his or her needs, may have to pay $550 simply to change carriers 
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and find a favorable pricing structure. This scenario could force customers 
to restrict internet usage as a result of having to settle for a plan that does 
not adequately address their usage needs. Not only does this exasperate the 
concerns of those who fear tiered pricing may restrict use of the mobile 
internet, but it also adds to the limitations already discussed concerning 
consumer choice. Eliminating the cost of purchasing a new handset from a 
new carrier and permitting customers to use their existing handsets on their 
new network creates greater freedom of mobility and allows customers 
searching for suitable pricing plans to test the market instead of being 
forced into a tier on their existing network. 
Additionally, although consumers may initially have a negative reaction 
to the implementation of tiered pricing,176 consumer-based tiered pricing is 
in line with consumer interests. As one commenter noted, “Consumers are 
used to paying about $30 or so for ‘unlimited’ data with a smartphone . . . 
.”177 Yet, “[m]ost people don’t even come close to using enough mobile 
data to justify spending $30 a month.”178 According to AT&T, almost half 
of their network capacity is being used by a staggeringly low 3 percent of 
its customers.179 As a result, as noted above, “the majority of users are 
essentially subsidizing the costs of these heavy data users and that doesn’t 
seem fair.”180 The system, as it stands now, is analogous to going out to 
dinner with a group of people and ordering a salad while everyone else 
orders the lobster dinner, and then at the end of the meal, splitting the cost 
evenly with everyone else. No consumer wants to pay for someone else’s 
service when there is no need to do so. Therefore, the tiered-pricing model 
is advantageous to consumers. 
V. STRIKING A BALANCE 
Today, as more people access the internet via their mobile handsets,181 
the network has become severely congested.182 Heavy network traffic 
results in broadband providers expressing the need to prioritize content as a 
form of network management in order to maintain service to their 
customers. One way to combat network congestion, in a neutral manner, is 
to institute tiered-pricing structures for data plans. Tiered pricing addresses 
both the need to allocate bandwidth efficiently and discourage content 
discrimination. In the context of the mobile broadband market, the concern 
of content discrimination and an open internet can also be addressed with 
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the abolition of handset exclusivity. Allowing customers to attach a device 
of their choosing to any mobile broadband network is essential to 
combating the discrimination problems associated with vertical integration 
and maintaining a neutral internet. Perhaps most importantly, instituting 
tiered pricing and eliminating handset exclusivity adheres to the FCC’s four 
principles of net neutrality.183 The elimination of handset exclusivity would 
allow consumers to connect devices of their choice to any network, in effect 
fostering competition,184 and disincentivizing content discrimination.185 The 
application of tiered-pricing structures would allow necessary, content-
neutral network management,186 greater customer choice regarding 
service,187 and greater transparency between carrier and customer.188 
CONCLUSION 
In today’s world, instituting tiered pricing for mobile data plans, while 
at the same time abolishing handset exclusivity, addresses both the concerns 
of net neutrality advocates as well as the pressing needs of broadband 
providers. Therefore, tiered pricing strikes the proper balance between 
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